Service for AAI: EGI Catchall Availability and continuity Plan

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Introduction

This page reports on the Availability and Continuity Plan for the EGI Catchall and it is the result of the risks assessment conducted for this service: a series of risks and treats has been identified and analysed, along with the correspondent countermeasures currently in place. Whenever a countermeasure is not considered satisfactory for either avoiding or reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of a risk, or its impact, it is agreed with the service provider a new treatment for improving the availability and continuity of the service. The process is concluded with an availability and continuity test.

Last Next
Risks assessment 2018-10-24 -
Av/Co plan in progress -

Performances

The performances reports in terms of Availability and Reliability are produced by ARGO on an almost real time basis and they are also periodically collected into the Documentation Database.

In the OLA it was agreed the following performances targets, on a monthly basis:

  • Availability: 99%
  • Reliability 99%

Over the past years, GOCDB hadn't particular Av/Co issues highlighted by the performances that need to be further investigated.

Risks assessment and management

For more details, please look at the google spreadsheet. We will report here a summary of the assessment.

Risks analysis (to update)

Risk id Risk description Affected components Established measures Risk level Treatment Expected duration of downtime / time for recovery
1 Service unavailable / loss of data due to hardware failure VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files The VOMS database and the MyProxy proxy directory are regularly backuped. Additionally, they are running on a redundant VM environment, on a redundant storage Low Service restored from backups "In the event of production hardware failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

2 Service unavailable / loss of data due to software failure VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files The VOMS database and the MyProxy proxy directory are regularly backuped. Additionally, they are running on a redundant VM environment, on a redundant storage Low Service restored from backups "In the event of production software failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

3 service unavailable / loss of data due to human error VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files The VOMS database and the MyProxy proxy directory are regularly backuped. Additionally, they are running on a redundant VM environment, on a redundant storage Low Service restored from backups "In the event of production service failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

4 service unavailable for network failure (Network outage with causes external of the site) VOMS, MyProxy There are redundant uplinks connecting the data center to the public network. Medium Service restored from backups "In the event of production network failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

5 Unavailability of key technical and support staff (holidays period, sickness, ...) VOMS, MyProxy There is always one member of the team available. Low - The length of the absence / declared downtime
6 Major disruption in the data centre. Fire, flood or electric failure for example VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files The data center is well maintained, with UPS, diesel generator and fire suppression system. Medium Service restored from backups "In the event of prolong data centre disruption affecting GOCDB, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

7 Major security incident. The system is compromised by external attackers and needs to be reinstalled and restored. VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files The VOMS database and the MyProxy proxy directory are regularly backuped. Low Service restored from backups "In the event of prolong data centre disruption affecting GOCDB, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

8 (D)DOS attack. The service is unavailable because of a coordinated DDOS. VOMS, MyProxy The network is monitored for DDOS attacks by GRNET NOC. Medium Service restored from backups Up to 4 hours

Outcome

The level of all the identified risks is acceptable and the countermeasures already adopted are considered satisfactory

Availability and Continuity test

Given the use of an off-site failover, it was agreed with the provider that testing a recovery scenario is not currently realistic.

In the event that the service at RAL disappears, the DNS entry would we flipped to point at the failover in DL, whilst reinstalling locally if needed. The failover at DL is accessible here: https://goc.dl.ac.uk . The provider recently updated its DNS entry to point at its load balancers using the scripts for the failover, so they are confident these work.

One of provider major pieces of work for this year is moving the GOCDB to a different internal infrastructure. This will introduce configuration management to GOCDB for the first time. As such whatever reinstall process they were to test today would be obsolete in a matter of months.

Once the movement have been made, it will be evaluated the execution of a recovery test.

Revision History

Version Authors Date Comments

Alessandro Paolini 2018-11-02 first draft, discussing with the provider