Service for AAI: EGI Catchall Availability and continuity Plan

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Introduction

This page reports on the Availability and Continuity Plan for the EGI Catchall and it is the result of the risks assessment conducted for this service: a series of risks and treats has been identified and analysed, along with the correspondent countermeasures currently in place. Whenever a countermeasure is not considered satisfactory for either avoiding or reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of a risk, or its impact, it is agreed with the service provider a new treatment for improving the availability and continuity of the service. The process is concluded with an availability and continuity test.

Last Next
Risks assessment 2018-10-24 -
Av/Co plan in progress -

Performances

The performances reports in terms of Availability and Reliability are produced by ARGO on an almost real time basis and they are also periodically collected into the Documentation Database.

In the OLA it was agreed the following performances targets, on a monthly basis:

  • Availability: 99%
  • Reliability 99%

Over the past years, GOCDB hadn't particular Av/Co issues highlighted by the performances that need to be further investigated.

Risks assessment and management

For more details, please look at the google spreadsheet. We will report here a summary of the assessment.

Risks analysis (to update)

Risk id Risk description Affected components Established measures Risk level Treatment Expected duration of downtime / time for recovery
1 Service unavailable / loss of data due to hardware failure VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files GOCDB has a separate failover instance. If the web server or database machines failed and were not readily restartable the failover would be engaged. Low In the case of a prolonged outage of the production hardware (+2 days), the failover would be set to read write mode, allowing the data to be updated. "In the event of production hardware failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

2 Service unavailable / loss of data due to software failure VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files GOCDB has a separate failover instance. If the web server or GOCDB software failed and were not readily restartable the failover would be engaged. As the database is unaffected, all data would eventually be propagated to the failover within an hour. Low In the case of a prolonged outage of the production hardware (+2 days), the failover would be set to read write mode, allowing the data to be updated. "In the event of production software failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

3 service unavailable / loss of data due to human error VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files Access to production systems limited, service and procedures documented internally, configuration of web portal and PI is backed up daily, database backed up hourly for failover Low In the case of a prolonged outage of the production service (+2 days) due to human error, the failover would be set to read write mode, allowing the data to be updated. "In the event of production service failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

4 service unavailable for network failure (Network outage with causes external of the site) VOMS, MyProxy GOCDB has a separate failover instance at a STFC data centre located at a different site. If the was a network failure at RAL and was not readily restartable the failover would be engaged. Low In the case of a prolonged outage of the network (+2 days), the failover would be set to read write mode, allowing the data to be updated. "In the event of production network failure, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

5 Unavailability of key technical and support staff (holidays period, sickness, ...) VOMS, MyProxy GOCDB technical / support staff try not to be on leave at the same time for a prolonged period. A cover person, capable of handling tickets and investigating minor problems, is assigned in the case of short term absences or an 'At Risk' is declared. Low Service would be restored on the return of technical / support staff The length of the absence / declared downtime
6 Major disruption in the data centre. Fire, flood or electric failure for example VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files GOCDB runs on UPS so should remain operational in the event of electrical failure. In the case of other, long lasting, data centre disruption, the failover would be engaged. Low In the case of a prolonged disruption (+2 days) to the data centre affecting GOCDB, the failover would be set to read write mode, allowing the data to be updated. "In the event of prolong data centre disruption affecting GOCDB, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

7 Major security incident. The system is compromised by external attackers and needs to be reinstalled and restored. VOMS database, MyProxy proxy files The failover would be engaged while security incidents are being investigated Low "In the case of a prolonged outage (+2 days) of the production GOCDB, the failover would be set to read write mode, allowing the data to be updated." "In the event of prolong data centre disruption affecting GOCDB, the service would be restored incrementally

0.5 working days: a broadcast would be made providing the URL to the read only failover 1 working day: The DNS entry for goc.egi.eu would be changed to point at the read only failover 2 working days: The failover would be set to read write mode"

8 (D)DOS attack. The service is unavailable because of a coordinated DDOS. VOMS, MyProxy The number of requests over time are monitored so any abnormal increase in traffic or response time would be noticed Low ability to block offending IPs Up to 4 hours

Outcome

The level of all the identified risks is acceptable and the countermeasures already adopted are considered satisfactory

Availability and Continuity test

Given the use of an off-site failover, it was agreed with the provider that testing a recovery scenario is not currently realistic.

In the event that the service at RAL disappears, the DNS entry would we flipped to point at the failover in DL, whilst reinstalling locally if needed. The failover at DL is accessible here: https://goc.dl.ac.uk . The provider recently updated its DNS entry to point at its load balancers using the scripts for the failover, so they are confident these work.

One of provider major pieces of work for this year is moving the GOCDB to a different internal infrastructure. This will introduce configuration management to GOCDB for the first time. As such whatever reinstall process they were to test today would be obsolete in a matter of months.

Once the movement have been made, it will be evaluated the execution of a recovery test.

Revision History

Version Authors Date Comments

Alessandro Paolini 2018-11-02 first draft, discussing with the provider