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Difference between revisions of "SVG:Meltdown and Spectre Vulnerabilities"

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To provide more detailed information about the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities, to complement the advisory, [[SVG:Advisory-SVG-CVE-2017-5753]].
To provide more detailed information about the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities, to complement the advisory, [[SVG:Advisory-SVG-CVE-2017-5753]].


We are continuing to add new information when we become aware of it, and the situation continues to change (02nd February 2018).
This was compiled in January and early February 2018
 
Information including more recent [[SVG:Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities | SVG Speculative execution vulnerabilities ]]


== What are they?  ==
== What are they?  ==
Line 28: Line 30:
As of Feb 2nd 2018, RedHat has [https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/speculativeexecution offered new kernel updates that can mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754), Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) and Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715)].
As of Feb 2nd 2018, RedHat has [https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/speculativeexecution offered new kernel updates that can mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754), Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) and Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715)].


However, due to instability issues, it has [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0093 removed the microcode updates required for Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715)]
However, due to instability issues, it has [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0093 removed the microcode updates required for Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715)]. Until Intel releases stable microcode or RedHat switches to 'retpoline', no mitigation for Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715) is safely usable.


It is currently possible to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) and Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) by:
It is currently possible to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) and Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) by:
Line 34: Line 36:
* On RHEL6: Updating the kernel to 2.6.32-696.18.7.el6, see [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0008 RHSA-2018:0008]
* On RHEL6: Updating the kernel to 2.6.32-696.18.7.el6, see [https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0008 RHSA-2018:0008]


=== Centos ===
Centos is following RedHat (see above).
It is currently possible to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) and Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) by:
* On Centos 7: Updating the kernel to 3.10.0-693.11.6.el7, see [https://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2018-January/022696.html CESA-2018:0007]
* On Centos 6: Updating the kernel to 2.6.32-696.18.7.el6, see [https://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2018-January/022701.html CESA-2018:0008]
=== Scientific Linux ===
Scientific Linux is following RedHat (see above).
It is currently possible to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) and Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) by:
* On SL7: Updating the kernel to 3.10.0-693.11.6.el7, see [https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180007-1/ SLSA-2018:0007-1]
* On SL6: Updating the kernel to 2.6.32-696.18.7.el6, see [https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180008-1/ SLSA-2018:0008-1]
Additional details as well as information on other systems and platforms can be found in the next section.


== More Information ==
== More Information ==


=== CERN ===
=== Relevant Advisories ===
==== CERN ====


CERN has compiled information which is useful for many EGI sites:
CERN has compiled information which is useful for many EGI sites:
Line 43: Line 63:
[https://security.web.cern.ch/security/advisories/spectre-meltdown/spectre-meltdown.shtml https://security.web.cern.ch/security/advisories/spectre-meltdown/spectre-meltdown.shtml]
[https://security.web.cern.ch/security/advisories/spectre-meltdown/spectre-meltdown.shtml https://security.web.cern.ch/security/advisories/spectre-meltdown/spectre-meltdown.shtml]


=== Intel ===
==== Intel ====


Intel has initially, on January 8th, [https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/27431/Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-File released new microcodes] to complement the IBRS kernel patchset. However, these new microcodes are in fact '''unstable''' and Intel has since then recommended to stop deploying them.
Intel has initially, on January 8th, [https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/27431/Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-File released new microcodes] to complement the IBRS kernel patchset. However, these new microcodes are in fact '''unstable''' and Intel has since then recommended to stop deploying them.
Line 50: Line 70:


More updates and information:
More updates and information:
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-responds-to-security-research-findings/ Initial response (Jan 3rd)]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-responds-to-security-research-findings/ Jan 3rd: Initial response]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news-releases/intel-issues-updates-protect-systems-security-exploits/ Jan 4th]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news-releases/intel-issues-updates-protect-systems-security-exploits/ Jan 4th]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-offers-security-issue-update/ Microcode released (Jan 9th)]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-offers-security-issue-update/ Jan 9th: Microcode released]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/editorials/intel-security-issue-update-initial-performance-data-results-client-systems/ performance impact analysis (Jan 10th)]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/editorials/intel-security-issue-update-initial-performance-data-results-client-systems/ Jan 10th: performance impact analysis]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-security-issue-update-addressing-reboot-issues/ Microcode unstability reported (Jan 11th)]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-security-issue-update-addressing-reboot-issues/ Jan 11th: Microcode unstability reported]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/firmware-updates-and-initial-performance-data-for-data-center-systems/ Jan 17th]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/firmware-updates-and-initial-performance-data-for-data-center-systems/ Jan 17th]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/root-cause-of-reboot-issue-identified-updated-guidance-for-customers-and-partners/ Instabilities causes found for 2 Intel series(Jan 22th)]
* [https://newsroom.intel.com/news/root-cause-of-reboot-issue-identified-updated-guidance-for-customers-and-partners/ Jan 22th: Instabilities causes found for 2 Intel series]


=== RedHat ===
=== Linux Distributions ===
==== RedHat ====


'''Important! [as of 17th January]'''
'''Important! [as of 17th January]'''
Line 76: Line 97:
* [https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5715]
* [https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5715]


=== CentOS ===
==== CentOS ====


'''Important! [as of 17th January]'''
'''Important! [as of 17th January]'''


Centos seems to be following Redhat in the revert of the microcode_ctl package, see [https://git.centos.org/blob/rpms!microcode_ctl.git/c7/SOURCES!disclaimer the disclaimer in the sources of the last package]:
Centos seems to be following Redhat in the revert of the microcode_ctl package, see [https://git.centos.org/blob/rpms!microcode_ctl.git/c7/SOURCES!disclaimer the disclaimer in the sources of the last package]
This update supersedes microcode provided  by Red Hat with the CVE-2017-5715 (“Spectre”)
CPU branch injection vulnerability mitigation.  (HIstorically, Red Hat has provided updated
microcode, developed by our microprocessor partners, as a customer convenience.)  Further
testing has uncovered problems with the microcode provided along with the “Spectre” mitigation
that could lead to system instabilities.  As a result, Red Hat is providing an microcode update
that reverts to the last known good microcode version dated before 03 January 2018.
Red Hat strongly recommends that customers contact their hardware provider for the latest microcode updates.
IMPORTANT: Customers using Intel Skylake-, Broadwell-, and Haswell-based platforms must obtain and
install updated microcode from their hardware vendor immediately. The "Spectre" mitigation requires
both an updated kernel from Red Hat and updated microcode from your hardware vendor.


<br>
<br>
Line 113: Line 123:
[https://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2018-January/date.html  https://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2018-January/date.html]
[https://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2018-January/date.html  https://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2018-January/date.html]


=== Scientific Linux  ===
==== Scientific Linux  ====


'''Important! [as of 18th January]'''
'''Important! [as of 18th January]'''


Scientific Linux is following RedHat in the revert of the microcode_ctl package, see [https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180093-1/ https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180093-1/]:
Scientific Linux is following RedHat in the revert of the microcode_ctl package, see [https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180093-1/ https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180093-1/]


This update supersedes the previous microcode update provided with the
<br>
CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre) CPU branch injection vulnerability mitigation.
Further testing has uncovered problems with the microcode provided along
with the Spectre mitigation that could lead to system instabilities.
As a result, this microcode update reverts to the last known good
microcode version dated before 03 January 2018.
You should contact your hardware provider for the latest microcode updates.
IMPORTANT: If you are using Intel Skylake-, Broadwell-, and Haswell-based
platforms, obtain and install updated microcode from your hardware
vendor immediately. The "Spectre" mitigation requires both an updated
kernel and updated microcode from your hardware vendor.


SL6:  
* SL6: [https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180008-1/ https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180008-1/]  
 
* SL7: [https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180007-1/ https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180007-1/]  
[https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180008-1/ https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180008-1/]  
 
SL7:  
 
[https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180007-1/ https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180007-1/]  


<br>  
<br>  


qemu-kvn:  
* SL6:
 
** qemu-kvm: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180024-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180024-1/]
SL6:  
** libvirt: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180030-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180030-1/]
 
* SL7:  
qemu-kvm: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180024-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180024-1/]  
** qemu-kvm: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180023-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180023-1/]
** libvirt: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180029-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180029-1/]  


libvirt: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180030-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180030-1/]
==== Ubuntu  ====


SL7:  
[https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/SpectreAndMeltdown https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/SpectreAndMeltdown]


qemu-kvm: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180023-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180023-1/]
==== Debian ====


libvirt: [http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180029-1/ http://scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180029-1/]  
[https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5715]
[https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-5753 CVE-2017-5753]
[https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-5754 CVE-2017-5754]


=== Ubuntu  ===
=== System Vendors ===
 
==== Supermicro ====
[https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/SpectreAndMeltdown https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/SpectreAndMeltdown]
 
=== Supermicro ===


[https://www.supermicro.com/support/security_Intel-SA-00088.cfm https://www.supermicro.com/support/security_Intel-SA-00088.cfm]
[https://www.supermicro.com/support/security_Intel-SA-00088.cfm https://www.supermicro.com/support/security_Intel-SA-00088.cfm]


=== Dell ===
==== Dell ====


'''Important! [as of 23rd January]'''
'''Important! [as of 23rd January]'''
Line 179: Line 171:
Note this is changing rather frequently
Note this is changing rather frequently


=== HPE ===
==== HPE ====


[as of January 23]
[as of January 23]
Line 187: Line 179:
[https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?sp4ts.oid=null&docLocale=en_US&docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03805en_us https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?sp4ts.oid=null&docLocale=en_US&docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03805en_us]
[https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?sp4ts.oid=null&docLocale=en_US&docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03805en_us https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?sp4ts.oid=null&docLocale=en_US&docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03805en_us]


=== Lenovo ===
==== Lenovo ====


[as of January 23]
[as of January 23]


Lenovo security advisory
Lenovo security advisory
=== Hypervisors ===


[https://support.lenovo.com/gb/en/solutions/len-18282 https://support.lenovo.com/gb/en/solutions/len-18282]
[https://support.lenovo.com/gb/en/solutions/len-18282 https://support.lenovo.com/gb/en/solutions/len-18282]
=== Xen  ===
==== Xen  ====




Line 202: Line 197:
* [https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Respond_to_Meltdown_and_Spectre https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Respond_to_Meltdown_and_Spectre]
* [https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Respond_to_Meltdown_and_Spectre https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Respond_to_Meltdown_and_Spectre]


=== QEMU-KVM  ===
==== QEMU-KVM  ====


In order to protect hypervisors from malicious VMs, the kernel, microcode and QEMU must be updated:
In order to protect hypervisors from malicious VMs, the kernel, microcode and QEMU must be updated:


[https://www.qemu.org/2018/01/04/spectre/ https://www.qemu.org/2018/01/04/spectre/]
[https://www.qemu.org/2018/01/04/spectre/ https://www.qemu.org/2018/01/04/spectre/]

Revision as of 15:27, 7 September 2018

Main page Software Security Checklist Issue Handling Advisories Notes On Risk Advisory Template More

Meltdown and Spectre Vulnerabilities


Purpose of this page

To provide more detailed information about the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities, to complement the advisory, SVG:Advisory-SVG-CVE-2017-5753.

This was compiled in January and early February 2018

Information including more recent SVG Speculative execution vulnerabilities

What are they?

These are vulnerabilities in the design of the chip hardware, and cannot be fully resolved by patching operating systems. However patches are available which mitigate these problems.

  • Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) affects most Intel chips.
  • Spectre (CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5715) affects a wide range of chips.

For more details, see https://meltdownattack.com/ , https://spectreattack.com/ and https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.dk/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html

How to mitigate these vulnerabilities

Each CVE can be mitigated via different ways:

  • Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) can be mitigated via Kernel Page Table Isolation, which is enabled by default in latest linux kernels
  • Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) has to be mitigated in each software which can be vulnerable. The latest linux kernel contains fixes to protect itself (does not protect other software).
  • Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715) can be (at least partially) mitigated via at least two different approach:
    • Using new Intel-specific MSR, added via a microcode update, to control indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS): Both a kernel and a microcode update are required. In addition, in case of virtualization, an update of the virtualization software (e.g. qemu & virt) is required to expose the new MSR to the VM.
    • Using "retpoline", a new software construct that can mitigate, on most CPUs, the vulnerability

RedHat

As of Feb 2nd 2018, RedHat has offered new kernel updates that can mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754), Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) and Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715).

However, due to instability issues, it has removed the microcode updates required for Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715). Until Intel releases stable microcode or RedHat switches to 'retpoline', no mitigation for Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715) is safely usable.

It is currently possible to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) and Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) by:

  • On RHEL7: Updating the kernel to 3.10.0-693.11.6.el7, see RHSA-2018:0007
  • On RHEL6: Updating the kernel to 2.6.32-696.18.7.el6, see RHSA-2018:0008

Centos

Centos is following RedHat (see above).

It is currently possible to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) and Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) by:

  • On Centos 7: Updating the kernel to 3.10.0-693.11.6.el7, see CESA-2018:0007
  • On Centos 6: Updating the kernel to 2.6.32-696.18.7.el6, see CESA-2018:0008

Scientific Linux

Scientific Linux is following RedHat (see above).

It is currently possible to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) and Spectre Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) by:

Additional details as well as information on other systems and platforms can be found in the next section.

More Information

Relevant Advisories

CERN

CERN has compiled information which is useful for many EGI sites:

https://security.web.cern.ch/security/advisories/spectre-meltdown/spectre-meltdown.shtml

Intel

Intel has initially, on January 8th, released new microcodes to complement the IBRS kernel patchset. However, these new microcodes are in fact unstable and Intel has since then recommended to stop deploying them.

Intel latest recommendation can be found in their advisory, INTEL-SA-00088

More updates and information:

Linux Distributions

RedHat

Important! [as of 17th January]

RedHat has issued new microcode_ctl packages to rollback the latest updates, see RHSA-2018:0093.


RedHat description:

RedHat CVE info:

CentOS

Important! [as of 17th January]

Centos seems to be following Redhat in the revert of the microcode_ctl package, see the disclaimer in the sources of the last package


CentOS 7:

CentOS 6:

See further in the centos-announce Security mails for January https://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2018-January/date.html

Scientific Linux

Important! [as of 18th January]

Scientific Linux is following RedHat in the revert of the microcode_ctl package, see https://www.scientificlinux.org/category/sl-errata/slsa-20180093-1/



Ubuntu

https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/SpectreAndMeltdown

Debian

CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5753 CVE-2017-5754

System Vendors

Supermicro

https://www.supermicro.com/support/security_Intel-SA-00088.cfm

Dell

Important! [as of 23rd January]

Dell is advising that all customers and partners should not deploy the BIOS update for the Spectre vulnerability at this time due to Intel’s advisory acknowledging reboot issues and unpredictable system behaviour.

http://www.dell.com/support/contents/uk/en/ukbsdt1/article/product-support/self-support-knowledgebase/software-and-downloads/support-for-meltdown-and-spectre


https://www.dell.com/support/article/uk/en/ukbsdt1/sln308588/microprocessor-side-channel-vulnerabilities-cve-2017-5715-cve-2017-5753-cve-2017-5754-impact-on-dell-emc-products-dell-enterprise-servers-storage-and-networking-?lang=en

Note this is changing rather frequently

HPE

[as of January 23]

HPE has updated their advisory to note that "Marked impacted products with TBD for System ROM updates per Intel's guidance on microcode issues" - so following suit with DELL.

https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?sp4ts.oid=null&docLocale=en_US&docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03805en_us

Lenovo

[as of January 23]

Lenovo security advisory


Hypervisors

https://support.lenovo.com/gb/en/solutions/len-18282

Xen

QEMU-KVM

In order to protect hypervisors from malicious VMs, the kernel, microcode and QEMU must be updated:

https://www.qemu.org/2018/01/04/spectre/

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