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Difference between revisions of "SVG:Advisory-SVG-2020-16648"

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<pre>


This advisory has not been released publicly yet.
Title:      EGI SVG 'ADVISORY' [TLP:WHITE] Singularity and unprivileged user namespaces  [EGI-SVG-2020-16648] 
 
Date:        2020-05-06
Updated:    2020-05-12
 
Affected software and risk
======================
 
Here we provide an important recommendation.
 
Package : Singularity
 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 supports a kernel feature called unprivileged user namespaces that enables Singularity to run completely unprivileged.
There is a significantly lower risk of future vulnerabilities if Singularity runs unprivileged, compared to the default setup of Singularity
which has setuid root enabled. 
 
Actions required/recommended
============================
 
Sites are asked to enable unprivileged user namespaces on their worker nodes. Where possible, and when there is a convenient opportunity,
sites should additionally either remove the Singularity rpm or change its configuration to run unprivileged. This depends on what kinds of
Singularity workflows a site allows to be used by VOs that are supported by the site. No LHC experiment requires Singularity rpms to be
installed anymore. In principle some other VO might expect Singularity rpms to installed and also might require it to have setuid allowed
for particular workflows.
 
Detailed recipes for the configuration changes are provided below.
 
Component installation information
==================================
 
See OSG information below.
 
More information
================
 
While EGI SVG does not normally send advisories unless a specific vulnerability has been found, our partners in OSG now recommend sites
change their Singularity configuration and EGI SVG considers it appropriate to do the same at this time.
 
**UPDATE 2020-05-12**
 
Decided to change to [WHITE] earlier than previously stated to help publicize encouraging a change to a more secure configuration when there is no vulnerability to potentially protect from future vulnerabilities.
 
OSG Information
================
 
Dear OSG Security Contacts,
 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 supports a kernel feature called unprivileged user namespaces that enables singularity to run completely
unprivileged.  All OSG VOs (including WLCG VOs) that use singularity are now configured to run singularity unprivileged out
of CVMFS when they can.  OSG security believes this to be a significantly lower risk than having singularity installed with setuid root enabled.
We recommend that sites enable unprivileged user namespaces on their RHEL 7 worker nodes if they haven't, and remove singularity rpms if there
is no non-OSG requirement to keep them.
 
IMPACTED VERSIONS:
 
RHEL 7.6 and later are affected.
RHEL 8 has unprivileged user namespaces enabled by default.
RHEL 6 cannot enable unprivileged user namespaces.
 
WHAT ARE THE VULNERABILITIES:
 
There are no known current exploits with setuid root singularity, but there have been in the past. 
Setuid root programs are notoriously difficult to secure, and there are likely to be more exploits discovered in the future.
 
WHAT YOU SHOULD DO:
 
On RHEL 7 worker nodes, enable unprivileged user namespaces by following the instructions on the OSG singularity installation page [1].
Then, if you have no requirement to keep the rpm installed for non-OSG purposes, remove singularity rpms from your worker nodes.
If your singularity installation is version 2, instead remove singularity-runtime rpms.  If you have to keep the singularity rpm installed,
consider setting the configuration 'allow setuid = no'.  More information on making that choice is available [2].
 
Note that if there were local changes to singularity.conf, VOs will no longer be using them.  Extra local bind paths can be added to jobs
through the SINGULARITY_BINDPATH environment variable.
 
REFERENCES
 
[1] https://opensciencegrid.org/docs/worker-node/install-singularity/#enabling-unprivileged-singularity
[2] https://opensciencegrid.org/docs/worker-node/install-singularity/#choosing-unprivileged-vs-privileged-singularity
 
TLP and URL
===========
 
** WHITE information - Unlimited  distribution
    - see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions **
URL:  https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/SVG:Advisory-SVG-2020-16648     
 
Minor updates may be made without re-distribution to the sites
 
Comments
========
 
Comments or questions should be sent to svg-rat  at  mailman.egi.eu
 
If you find or become aware of another vulnerability which is relevant to EGI you may report it by e-mail to 
 
report-vulnerability at egi.eu
 
the EGI Software Vulnerability Group will take a look according to the procedure defined in [R 3] 
 
Note that this is undergoing revision to fully handle vulnerabilities in the EOSC-hub era.
 
References
==========
 
See references in OSG information
 
[R 3] https://documents.egi.eu/public/ShowDocument?docid=3145
 
Credit
======
 
SVG was informed of the plan to request sites to enable unprivileged namespaces when running singularity by Dave Dykstra.
 
Timeline 
========
Yyyy-mm-dd  [EGI-SVG-2020-16648]
 
2020-04-28 EGI SVG informed of OSG's plan to request sites to enable unprivileged namespaces when running
          singularity by Dave Dykstra
2020-04-30 Acknowledgement from the EGI SVG
2020-05-04 EGI SVG drafted advisory for EGI sites ready for when OSG make announcement
2020-05-06 Advisory sent to sites
2020-05-12 Changed to [WHITE] Advisory placed on wiki.
 
Context
=======
 
This advisory has been prepared as part of the effort to fulfil EGI SVG's purpose
"To minimize the risk to the EGI infrastructure arising from software vulnerabilities"
 
The risk is that assessed by the group, according to the EGI SVG issue handling procedure [R 3]  in the context of how the software is used
in the EGI infrastructure. It is the opinion of the group, we do not guarantee it to be correct.
The risk may also be higher or lower in other deployments depending on how the software is used. 
 
-----------------------------
This advisory is subject to the Creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ and the EGI https://www.egi.eu/
Software Vulnerability Group must be credited.
-----------------------------
 
Note that the SVG issue handling procedure is currently under review, to take account of the increasing inhomogeneity of the
EGI infrastructure and the services in the EOSC-hub catalogue.
 
On behalf of the EGI SVG,
 


</pre>
</pre>

Latest revision as of 12:05, 12 May 2020

Main page Software Security Checklist Issue Handling Advisories Notes On Risk Advisory Template More

Advisory-SVG-2020-16648



Title:       EGI SVG 'ADVISORY' [TLP:WHITE] Singularity and unprivileged user namespaces  [EGI-SVG-2020-16648]  

Date:        2020-05-06 
Updated:     2020-05-12

Affected software and risk
======================

Here we provide an important recommendation.

Package : Singularity 

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 supports a kernel feature called unprivileged user namespaces that enables Singularity to run completely unprivileged. 
There is a significantly lower risk of future vulnerabilities if Singularity runs unprivileged, compared to the default setup of Singularity 
which has setuid root enabled.  

Actions required/recommended
============================

Sites are asked to enable unprivileged user namespaces on their worker nodes. Where possible, and when there is a convenient opportunity, 
sites should additionally either remove the Singularity rpm or change its configuration to run unprivileged. This depends on what kinds of 
Singularity workflows a site allows to be used by VOs that are supported by the site. No LHC experiment requires Singularity rpms to be 
installed anymore. In principle some other VO might expect Singularity rpms to installed and also might require it to have setuid allowed 
for particular workflows. 

Detailed recipes for the configuration changes are provided below.

Component installation information
==================================

See OSG information below.

More information
================

While EGI SVG does not normally send advisories unless a specific vulnerability has been found, our partners in OSG now recommend sites 
change their Singularity configuration and EGI SVG considers it appropriate to do the same at this time.

**UPDATE 2020-05-12**

Decided to change to [WHITE] earlier than previously stated to help publicize encouraging a change to a more secure configuration when there is no vulnerability to potentially protect from future vulnerabilities.

OSG Information
================

Dear OSG Security Contacts,

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 supports a kernel feature called unprivileged user namespaces that enables singularity to run completely
 unprivileged.  All OSG VOs (including WLCG VOs) that use singularity are now configured to run singularity unprivileged out 
of CVMFS when they can.  OSG security believes this to be a significantly lower risk than having singularity installed with setuid root enabled.
 We recommend that sites enable unprivileged user namespaces on their RHEL 7 worker nodes if they haven't, and remove singularity rpms if there
 is no non-OSG requirement to keep them. 

IMPACTED VERSIONS:

RHEL 7.6 and later are affected.
RHEL 8 has unprivileged user namespaces enabled by default.
RHEL 6 cannot enable unprivileged user namespaces.

WHAT ARE THE VULNERABILITIES:

There are no known current exploits with setuid root singularity, but there have been in the past.  
Setuid root programs are notoriously difficult to secure, and there are likely to be more exploits discovered in the future.

WHAT YOU SHOULD DO:

On RHEL 7 worker nodes, enable unprivileged user namespaces by following the instructions on the OSG singularity installation page [1]. 
 Then, if you have no requirement to keep the rpm installed for non-OSG purposes, remove singularity rpms from your worker nodes. 
 If your singularity installation is version 2, instead remove singularity-runtime rpms.  If you have to keep the singularity rpm installed, 
consider setting the configuration 'allow setuid = no'.  More information on making that choice is available [2].

Note that if there were local changes to singularity.conf, VOs will no longer be using them.  Extra local bind paths can be added to jobs 
through the SINGULARITY_BINDPATH environment variable.

REFERENCES

[1] https://opensciencegrid.org/docs/worker-node/install-singularity/#enabling-unprivileged-singularity
[2] https://opensciencegrid.org/docs/worker-node/install-singularity/#choosing-unprivileged-vs-privileged-singularity

TLP and URL
===========

** WHITE information - Unlimited  distribution 
    - see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions ** 
URL:   https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/SVG:Advisory-SVG-2020-16648      

Minor updates may be made without re-distribution to the sites

Comments
========

Comments or questions should be sent to svg-rat  at  mailman.egi.eu

If you find or become aware of another vulnerability which is relevant to EGI you may report it by e-mail to  

report-vulnerability at egi.eu

the EGI Software Vulnerability Group will take a look according to the procedure defined in [R 3]  

Note that this is undergoing revision to fully handle vulnerabilities in the EOSC-hub era. 

References
==========

See references in OSG information

[R 3] https://documents.egi.eu/public/ShowDocument?docid=3145

Credit
======

SVG was informed of the plan to request sites to enable unprivileged namespaces when running singularity by Dave Dykstra. 

Timeline  
========
Yyyy-mm-dd  [EGI-SVG-2020-16648] 

2020-04-28 EGI SVG informed of OSG's plan to request sites to enable unprivileged namespaces when running 
           singularity by Dave Dykstra
2020-04-30 Acknowledgement from the EGI SVG 
2020-05-04 EGI SVG drafted advisory for EGI sites ready for when OSG make announcement 
2020-05-06 Advisory sent to sites
2020-05-12 Changed to [WHITE] Advisory placed on wiki. 

Context
=======

This advisory has been prepared as part of the effort to fulfil EGI SVG's purpose 
"To minimize the risk to the EGI infrastructure arising from software vulnerabilities"

The risk is that assessed by the group, according to the EGI SVG issue handling procedure [R 3]  in the context of how the software is used 
in the EGI infrastructure. It is the opinion of the group, we do not guarantee it to be correct. 
The risk may also be higher or lower in other deployments depending on how the software is used.   

-----------------------------
This advisory is subject to the Creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ and the EGI https://www.egi.eu/ 
Software Vulnerability Group must be credited. 
-----------------------------

Note that the SVG issue handling procedure is currently under review, to take account of the increasing inhomogeneity of the 
EGI infrastructure and the services in the EOSC-hub catalogue.

On behalf of the EGI SVG,