Difference between revisions of "EGI CSIRT:Security challenges"

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* to evaluate the efficiency of the various incident response operations aiming at containment.
 
* to evaluate the efficiency of the various incident response operations aiming at containment.
 
* trigger and improve the collaboration of the full incident response chain, involving security teams from the RCs, NGIs, EGI, VOs and CAs.
 
* trigger and improve the collaboration of the full incident response chain, involving security teams from the RCs, NGIs, EGI, VOs and CAs.
 +
  
 
== Scenario: Stolen Credentials ==
 
== Scenario: Stolen Credentials ==
A common problem in distributed environments is that user credentials get compromised resulting in an illicit usage of the resources.
+
A common problem in distributed environments is that user credentials get compromised resulting in illicit usage of resources.
  
This might happen in course of brute force attacks on weak passwords, lost/stolen hardware, phishing, or as a result of an earlier incident, where this data got harvested by the attacker.
+
This might happen as a result of brute force attacks on weak passwords, lost/stolen hardware, phishing, or following an earlier incident where this data was harvested by the attacker.
 +
In addition, in the Cloud environment, we rather often see that users choose insecure (default) configuration for services they install or introduce other vulnerabilities which are then quickly exploited by automated attacks constantly targeting all systems connected to the internet.
  
Stolen or bruteforced (ssh) credentials in distributed environments carry the additional risk that these incidents can spread out out rapidly affecting multiple resource centres in multiple countries. Therefore proper access management is crucial in incident response.
+
Stolen or brute forced (ssh) credentials in distributed environments carry the additional risk that such incidents can spread rapidly, affecting multiple resource centres in multiple countries. Therefore proper access management is crucial in incident response.
In grid environments access to the resources is usually controlled based on x509 certificates.
+
In the EGI infrastructure access to resources is usually controlled based on x509 certificates.  
  
 
x509 access management can happen on different levels, each action has a certain delay until it takes effect and a certain scope.  
 
x509 access management can happen on different levels, each action has a certain delay until it takes effect and a certain scope.  
Line 21: Line 23:
 
* Suspend DN at VOMS, up to 1 week, already issued voms-proxies remain valid, no new proxies will be issued. Scope VO wide, certificate could also be used within other VOs.
 
* Suspend DN at VOMS, up to 1 week, already issued voms-proxies remain valid, no new proxies will be issued. Scope VO wide, certificate could also be used within other VOs.
 
* CA revokes certificate, takes effect when the new CRLs are loaded to the services, up to 48 hours, globally. Certificate will not be accepted at an service.
 
* CA revokes certificate, takes effect when the new CRLs are loaded to the services, up to 48 hours, globally. Certificate will not be accepted at an service.
 +
* The FedCloud user management may not be fully integrated in the central suspension and therefore requires some manual intervention of the RC admins to make sure that the DN in question can not access the interfaces to start/stop/delete VMs.
  
Since suspending at RC resp. service level is immediately effective it is crucial, that the RC security teams as well as the VO security teams managing the access to their VO-WMS are trained to suspend a reported malicious certififcate DN on all of there systems, stop all running processes related to that DN, and to trace back a job to the originating host.
+
Since suspending at the RC service level is immediately effective it is crucial that the RC security teams, as well as the VO security teams, managing the access to their resources are trained to suspend a reported malicious certififcate DN on all of there systems, to stop all running processes related to that DN, and to trace back a IP/VM to the controlling DN.
 
 
'''=> This is not needed here '''
 
 
 
EGI-CSIRT action on this topic is at two points:
 
<BR/> - development of drills framework. They are available for egi sites; this is to help them verify their security maturity.
 
<BR/> - challenges at egi levels. Some wide level security challenge campaign are organized; this contributes to security at project level.
 
For further informations, you can contact ssc-monitor(at)zwaan.nikhefhousing.nl .
 
  
''' <='''
+
At the same time the state of the VM in question should be preserved for later investigation and further access to it suspended.
  
 
== Security challenges: what is expected from sites ? ==
 
== Security challenges: what is expected from sites ? ==
  
=== What is important to bear in mind ? ===
+
=== Rules ===
  
 
The sites contacted for a challenge are asked to follow the normal security incident response procedure, and react as if the incident was real, with the two following exceptions:
 
The sites contacted for a challenge are asked to follow the normal security incident response procedure, and react as if the incident was real, with the two following exceptions:
 
<pre>
 
<pre>
 
       1. No sanctions must be applied against the Virtual
 
       1. No sanctions must be applied against the Virtual
         Organization (VO) that was used to submit the job.
+
         Organization (VO) that was used to submit the job / start the VM.
         In case of of
+
          
  
 
       2. All "multi-destination" alerts must be addressed to
 
       2. All "multi-destination" alerts must be addressed to
 
         the e-mail list which has been designated for the test:
 
         the e-mail list which has been designated for the test:
  
              ssc-monitor(at)zwaan.nikhefhousing.nl
 
 
        DO NOT use:
 
 
                     abuse(at)egi.eu
 
                     abuse(at)egi.eu
  
Line 54: Line 47:
 
         originally intended "multi-destination" address(es) in
 
         originally intended "multi-destination" address(es) in
 
         the body of your message.
 
         the body of your message.
 +
        Make sure to have the string:
 +
                   
 +
                    [SSC]
 +
 +
        in the subject of the message.
 
</pre>
 
</pre>
  
== Information to be gathered at the sites ==
+
== Scope of the SSC / Information to be gathered at the sites ==
For an initial response and first directions answers to the following questions might be useful.
+
In this challenge the following basic Incident Response activities will get evaluated:
 +
* Communications: Provide in time information to be used in Incident Response
 +
* Containment:
 +
** Suspend DNs from accessing, starting, deleting a VM
 +
** Snapshot a live VM associated to a reported IP, including its memory
 +
* Traceability:
 +
**  IP based, given a time-stamp and an IP, find a DN using a VM under the IP in question.
 +
**  DN based: given a DN, find the IPs associated to VMs running under the DN in question
 +
* Forensics
 +
** Network connections of IP in time range X
 +
 
 +
== For an initial response and first directions try to find answers to the following questions ==
  
 
*NETWORK:  
 
*NETWORK:  
- Are there any other suspicious connections open? If so to which IPs
 
 
   
 
   
  - Is network monitoring data (e.g. netflows) available?
+
  - Are there any other suspicious connections open to/from a reported IP or jobs running under a reported DN?
 +
  If so, to which IPs?
 +
 +
- What are the DNs associated to the reported IP?
  
 
*CONTAINMENT:
 
*CONTAINMENT:
  - Does the process belong to a batch job or an interactive login?
+
  - If possible suspend
 +
- From where (IPs) were the jobs submitted?
 
   
 
   
  - From where was the login/job submission done?
+
  - From where (IPs) did l.
 
   
 
   
  - In case it is a Grid-Job, the following questions are important:
+
  - To which VO is the user/certificate affiliated?
    -To which VO is the user/certificate affiliated?
 
 
   
 
   
    - Which grid-certificates (DN) are involved in this test-incident?
+
- Which grid-certificates (DN) are involved in this test-incident?
 
     # Example: DN-1: CN=John Doe, O=<SomeInstitute>,O=<Something>, ..."
 
     # Example: DN-1: CN=John Doe, O=<SomeInstitute>,O=<Something>, ..."
 
   
 
   
  - Since when were the jobs running?
+
  - Since when were the VM running?
 
  # Example: YYYY:MM:DD hh:mm
 
  # Example: YYYY:MM:DD hh:mm
 
  Date:
 
  Date:
 
   
 
   
- Trace back the job to the originating UI or WMS.
 
  
The sites should provide the security teams asap with this information at latest within one working day.
+
The sites should provide the security teams asap with this information at the latest within one working day.
The time needed to pass this information to EGI-CSIRT  by replying to the alarm mail will be measured and evaluated.
+
The time needed to pass this information to EGI-CSIRT  by replying to the alarm mail will be measured and evaluated.
Replying to the alarm mail will automatically use the above sketched RTIR system.
 
  
 
== What is the normal security incident response procedure? ==
 
== What is the normal security incident response procedure? ==
  
 +
This exercise will also test the current [https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/SEC01 Incident Response Procedure], and here in particular [https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/SEC01#Incident_Analysis_Guideline step 5], which covers the information collected for the coordinated incident response.
  
Following is site checklist for normal incident response procedure.
+
Please try to follow this procedure where possible, and note/report any problems with it
 
 
<pre>      PLEASE REMIND THAT FOR THE CHALLENGE
 
          THE PROCEDURE IS APPLIED WITH RESTRICTIONS
 
          STATED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION
 
          In case of doubt please contact: ssc-monitor(at)zwaan.nikhefhousing.nl
 
</pre>
 
 
 
https://wiki.egi.eu/w/images/c/cb/Checklist-screenshot.png
 
  
<pre>      PLEASE REMIND THAT FOR THE CHALLENGE
+
<pre>       
 +
          PLEASE REMEMBER THAT FOR THE CHALLENGE
 
           THE PROCEDURE IS APPLIED WITH RESTRICTIONS
 
           THE PROCEDURE IS APPLIED WITH RESTRICTIONS
           STATED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION
+
           AS STATED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION.
           In case of doubt please contact: ssc-monitor(at)zwaan.nikhefhousing.nl
+
           For questions please contact: ssc(at)mailman.egi.eu
 
</pre>
 
</pre>
  
 
More informations about EGI security procedures ( flowchart, formal document, forensic howto ... ) can be found here : https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:Policies
 
More informations about EGI security procedures ( flowchart, formal document, forensic howto ... ) can be found here : https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:Policies
  
Please also visit our [[Forensic Howto]] wiki pages. If you want to contribute, just send your input to egi-csirt-team(at)mailman.egi.eu.
+
Please also visit our [[Forensic Howto]] wiki pages. If you want to contribute, just send your input to irtf(at)mailman.egi.eu.
  
== Evaluation - Report generation ==
+
== Scores, Evaluation - Report generation ==
  
 
We distinguish  between
 
We distinguish  between
Line 115: Line 118:
 
#initial feedback: 4h
 
#initial feedback: 4h
 
#found malicious job/processes/stop them: 4h
 
#found malicious job/processes/stop them: 4h
#ban problematic certificate: 8h
+
#ban problematic certificate: 4h
 
#contain the malicious binary and sent it to the incident-coordinator: 24h
 
#contain the malicious binary and sent it to the incident-coordinator: 24h
  
These will be measured by the ssc-monitor and the points the sites get are  
+
These will be measured by the ssc-monitor and the scores the sites get are  
 
calculated according to the formula stated on the wiki  page.
 
calculated according to the formula stated on the wiki  page.
Times are relative to the alarm to the site, we try to make sure that the  
+
Times are relative to the timestamp in the alarm ticket sent to the site, we try to make sure that the  
 
alarms will be send during office-hours (09:00 - 18:00, local time).
 
alarms will be send during office-hours (09:00 - 18:00, local time).
The target times might change, will be in the final version on the wiki page.
 
 
2) Collaborative investigations:
 
Since we want to achieve cross site communication, and possibly collaboration
 
on the "malware" forensics the evaluation schema has changed accordingly.
 
I..e Network forensics are needed, but we don't measure this, since due to the
 
overall SSC set-up, most of this information should already be available to
 
the "more western" sites relative to the initially alarmed sites.
 
 
ban/unban of the pilot-job-submitter DN is based on local policies. It will
 
not be measured, but a statement on the decision, whether to ban/unban the
 
pilot-job-submitter or not, is expected.
 
 
= Security challenge: how is it operated ? =
 
== Participating sites ==
 
# Format GOC-Name PANDA-Name NGI-NAME VO)
 
Taiwan-LCG2            ANALY_TAIWAN    APAC atlas
 
Australia-ATLAS        ANALY_AUSTRALIA APAC atlas
 
CA-SCINET-T2            ANALY_SCINET    ROC-CA atlas
 
CA-VICTORIA-WESTGRID-T2 ANALY_VICTORIA-WG1  ROC-CA atlas
 
TRIUMF-LCG2            ANALY_TRIUMF    ROC-CA atlas
 
BEIJING-LCG2            ANALY_BEIJING  ROC-CA atlas
 
CERN-PROD              ANALY_CERN  CERN atlas
 
CYFRONET-LCG2          ANALY_CYF  PL  atlas
 
praguelcg2              ANALY_FZU  CZ  atlas
 
DESY-HH                ANALY_DESY-HH  DE atlas
 
FZK-LCG2                ANALY_FZK  DE atlas
 
GoeGrid                ANALY_GOEGRID  DE atlas
 
HEPHY-UIBK              ANALY_HEPHY-UIBK    DE atlas
 
TUDresden-ZIH          ANALY_DRESDEN  DE atlas
 
UAM-LCG2                ANALY_UAM  SPAIN  atlas
 
pic                    ANALY_PIC  SPAIN  atlas
 
IFAE                    ANALY_IFAE  SPAIN  atlas
 
IFIC-LCG2              ANALY_IFIC  SPAIN  atlas
 
csTCDie                ANALY_CSTCDIE IE atlas
 
IL-TAU-HEP              ANALY_IL-TAU-HEP IL atlas
 
TECHNION-HEP            ANALY_TECHNION-HEP  IL atlas
 
WEIZMANN-LCG2          ANALY_WEIZMANN  IL atlas
 
INFN-FRASCATI          ANALY_INFN-FRASCATI Italy atlas
 
INFN-MILANO-ATLASC      ANALY_INFN-MILANO-ATLASC Italy atlas
 
INFN-ROMA1              ANALY_INFN-ROMA1    Italy atlas
 
INFN-T1                ANALY_INFN-T1  Italy atlas
 
NIKHEF-ELPROD          ANALY_NIKHEF-ELPROD NL atlas
 
SARA-MATRIX            ANALY_SARA  NL atlas
 
LIP-Coimbra            ANALY_LIP-Coimbra P atlas
 
LIP-Lisbon              ANALY_LIP-Lisbon    P atlas
 
NCG-INGRID-PT          ANALY_NCG-INGRID-PT P atlas
 
ITEP                    ANALY_ITEP RU atlas
 
JINR-LCG2              ANALY_JINR  RU atlas
 
RRC-KI                  ANALY_RRC-KI    RU atlas
 
RU-Protvino-IHEP        ANALY_IHEP  RU atlas
 
ru-PNPI                ANALY_PNPI  RU atlas
 
ARC-SITE-SI            ARC-pikolit.ijs.si SI  atlas
 
ARC-SITE-CH            ARC-ce.lhep.unibe.ch    CH  atlas
 
ARC-SITE-liu-SE        ARC-arc-ce.smokerings.nsc.liu.se    SE atlas
 
ARC-SITE-umu-SE        ARC-jeannedarc.hpc2n.umu.se SE  atlas
 
UKI-SCOTGRID-GLASGOW    ANALY_GLASGOW  UK atlas
 
UKI-NORTHGRID-LANCS-HEP ANALY_LANCS UK atlas
 
UKI-SOUTHGRID-CAM-HEP  ANALY_CAM  UK atlas
 
IN2P3-LPSC              ANALY_LPSC  F  atlas
 
 
== Tools ==
 
 
A framework has been developped to automate the operation of EGI security challenges.
 
  
The release of may 2011 contains: the panda framework for job submission, a prototype of the new EGI-CSIRT ticketing system based on RTIR.
+
and 2) per site Forensic operations:
 +
#all sites will receive "malware" with unique per site artifacts like UUIDs, URLs, IPs etc  finding them may require more advanced forensic operations, like memory analysis. These findings should be reported to IRTF within the ssc incident ticket as soon as they are found.
  
The test malware is not intrusive, it does not try to get elevated priviledges.
+
The reported artifacts will be extracted from the transactions in the ticket. The available scores will decrease over time.
 
 
More informations about the framework are given at [[security drills framework]].
 
  
 
== Post processing, clean up ==
 
== Post processing, clean up ==
  
 
As part of the incident handling, Grid authorizations may have been withdrawn from the DN that was used to submit the job. When the incident response procedure is complete, the test operator will explicitly request restoration of any such authorizations to their original state.
 
As part of the incident handling, Grid authorizations may have been withdrawn from the DN that was used to submit the job. When the incident response procedure is complete, the test operator will explicitly request restoration of any such authorizations to their original state.
 +
 +
== SSC Evaluation Form ==
 +
[[File:Lhcb score table template.png|800px]]
  
 
= De-briefing =
 
= De-briefing =
Line 201: Line 142:
 
When the challenge has been completed on a representative number of Sites, the test operator will ask for de-briefing input from the participating Sites. Material submitted will be used to edit a report. The report will be circulated to the contributors for comments before being presented to the EGI-CSIRT.
 
When the challenge has been completed on a representative number of Sites, the test operator will ask for de-briefing input from the participating Sites. Material submitted will be used to edit a report. The report will be circulated to the contributors for comments before being presented to the EGI-CSIRT.
  
== SSC5 Feedbacks ==
+
== Communication Template Debriefing ==
 +
Dear all,
 +
thank you for your contributions to the SSC-19.03
 +
 +
This message is about to inform you that the SSC-19.03 is now over. You should receive the site report the next days.
 +
 +
 +
As a clean-up step we would now ask the challenged sites to restore eventually banned credentials, in particular:
 +
   
 +
    CN=Amelie Caillet, CN=700993, CN=acaillet, OU=Users, OU=Organic Units, DC=cern, DC=ch
 +
 +
and
 +
 
 +
    CN=Cindy Denis, CN=759002, CN=cidenis, OU=Users, OU=Organic Units, DC=cern, DC=ch
 +
 
  
Moved to EGI CSIRT private wiki: https://wiki.egi.eu/csirt/index.php/SSC5_Feedback
+
Remark: Not sure if it is worth to also ask them to clean up the worker nodes where the payload ran. This should have happened meanwhile automatically, the sites where we saw long living bots  got informed to kill them (in May ;-))

Latest revision as of 02:21, 9 July 2019


| Mission | Members | Contacts
| Incident handling | Alerts | Monitoring | Security challenges | Procedures | Dissemination



Security challenges: what is it about ?

The goals of the security drills are:

  • to investigate whether sufficient information is available to be able conduct an audit trace as part of an incident response, and to ensure that appropriate communications channels are available.
  • to assess the incident response capabilities of the involved security teams.
  • to evaluate the efficiency of the various incident response operations aiming at containment.
  • trigger and improve the collaboration of the full incident response chain, involving security teams from the RCs, NGIs, EGI, VOs and CAs.


Scenario: Stolen Credentials

A common problem in distributed environments is that user credentials get compromised resulting in illicit usage of resources.

This might happen as a result of brute force attacks on weak passwords, lost/stolen hardware, phishing, or following an earlier incident where this data was harvested by the attacker. In addition, in the Cloud environment, we rather often see that users choose insecure (default) configuration for services they install or introduce other vulnerabilities which are then quickly exploited by automated attacks constantly targeting all systems connected to the internet.

Stolen or brute forced (ssh) credentials in distributed environments carry the additional risk that such incidents can spread rapidly, affecting multiple resource centres in multiple countries. Therefore proper access management is crucial in incident response. In the EGI infrastructure access to resources is usually controlled based on x509 certificates.

x509 access management can happen on different levels, each action has a certain delay until it takes effect and a certain scope.

  • Resource Center / Service level, immediately, bans the user at the RC/Service
  • Suspend DN at VOMS, up to 1 week, already issued voms-proxies remain valid, no new proxies will be issued. Scope VO wide, certificate could also be used within other VOs.
  • CA revokes certificate, takes effect when the new CRLs are loaded to the services, up to 48 hours, globally. Certificate will not be accepted at an service.
  • The FedCloud user management may not be fully integrated in the central suspension and therefore requires some manual intervention of the RC admins to make sure that the DN in question can not access the interfaces to start/stop/delete VMs.

Since suspending at the RC service level is immediately effective it is crucial that the RC security teams, as well as the VO security teams, managing the access to their resources are trained to suspend a reported malicious certififcate DN on all of there systems, to stop all running processes related to that DN, and to trace back a IP/VM to the controlling DN.

At the same time the state of the VM in question should be preserved for later investigation and further access to it suspended.

Security challenges: what is expected from sites ?

Rules

The sites contacted for a challenge are asked to follow the normal security incident response procedure, and react as if the incident was real, with the two following exceptions:

      1. No sanctions must be applied against the Virtual
         Organization (VO) that was used to submit the job / start the VM.
         

      2. All "multi-destination" alerts must be addressed to
         the e-mail list which has been designated for the test:

                     abuse(at)egi.eu

         for Security Service Challenges. Instead, insert the
         originally intended "multi-destination" address(es) in
         the body of your message.
         Make sure to have the string: 
                    
                     [SSC] 

         in the subject of the message.

Scope of the SSC / Information to be gathered at the sites

In this challenge the following basic Incident Response activities will get evaluated:

  • Communications: Provide in time information to be used in Incident Response
  • Containment:
    • Suspend DNs from accessing, starting, deleting a VM
    • Snapshot a live VM associated to a reported IP, including its memory
  • Traceability:
    • IP based, given a time-stamp and an IP, find a DN using a VM under the IP in question.
    • DN based: given a DN, find the IPs associated to VMs running under the DN in question
  • Forensics
    • Network connections of IP in time range X

For an initial response and first directions try to find answers to the following questions

  • NETWORK:
- Are there any other suspicious connections open to/from a reported IP or jobs running under a reported DN? 
  If so, to which IPs?

- What are the DNs associated to the reported IP?
  • CONTAINMENT:
- If possible suspend 
- From where (IPs) were the jobs submitted?

- From where (IPs) did l.

- To which VO is the user/certificate affiliated?

- Which grid-certificates (DN) are involved in this test-incident?
   # Example: DN-1: CN=John Doe, O=<SomeInstitute>,O=<Something>, ..."

- Since when were the VM running?
# Example: YYYY:MM:DD hh:mm
Date:

The sites should provide the security teams asap with this information at the latest within one working day. The time needed to pass this information to EGI-CSIRT by replying to the alarm mail will be measured and evaluated.

What is the normal security incident response procedure?

This exercise will also test the current Incident Response Procedure, and here in particular step 5, which covers the information collected for the coordinated incident response.

Please try to follow this procedure where possible, and note/report any problems with it

      
           PLEASE REMEMBER THAT FOR THE CHALLENGE
           THE PROCEDURE IS APPLIED WITH RESTRICTIONS
           AS STATED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION.
           For questions please contact: ssc(at)mailman.egi.eu

More informations about EGI security procedures ( flowchart, formal document, forensic howto ... ) can be found here : https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:Policies

Please also visit our Forensic Howto wiki pages. If you want to contribute, just send your input to irtf(at)mailman.egi.eu.

Scores, Evaluation - Report generation

We distinguish between

1) Measurable per site operations (with target times):

  1. initial feedback: 4h
  2. found malicious job/processes/stop them: 4h
  3. ban problematic certificate: 4h
  4. contain the malicious binary and sent it to the incident-coordinator: 24h

These will be measured by the ssc-monitor and the scores the sites get are calculated according to the formula stated on the wiki page. Times are relative to the timestamp in the alarm ticket sent to the site, we try to make sure that the alarms will be send during office-hours (09:00 - 18:00, local time).

and 2) per site Forensic operations:

  1. all sites will receive "malware" with unique per site artifacts like UUIDs, URLs, IPs etc finding them may require more advanced forensic operations, like memory analysis. These findings should be reported to IRTF within the ssc incident ticket as soon as they are found.

The reported artifacts will be extracted from the transactions in the ticket. The available scores will decrease over time.

Post processing, clean up

As part of the incident handling, Grid authorizations may have been withdrawn from the DN that was used to submit the job. When the incident response procedure is complete, the test operator will explicitly request restoration of any such authorizations to their original state.

SSC Evaluation Form

Lhcb score table template.png

De-briefing

When the challenge has been completed on a representative number of Sites, the test operator will ask for de-briefing input from the participating Sites. Material submitted will be used to edit a report. The report will be circulated to the contributors for comments before being presented to the EGI-CSIRT.

Communication Template Debriefing

Dear all, 
thank you for your contributions to the SSC-19.03

This message is about to inform you that the SSC-19.03 is now over. You should receive the site report the next days.


As a clean-up step we would now ask the challenged sites to restore eventually banned credentials, in particular:

   CN=Amelie Caillet, CN=700993, CN=acaillet, OU=Users, OU=Organic Units, DC=cern, DC=ch

and
 
   CN=Cindy Denis, CN=759002, CN=cidenis, OU=Users, OU=Organic Units, DC=cern, DC=ch


Remark: Not sure if it is worth to also ask them to clean up the worker nodes where the payload ran. This should have happened meanwhile automatically, the sites where we saw long living bots got informed to kill them (in May ;-))