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Difference between revisions of "EGI CSIRT:Incident reporting"

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== Initial HEADS-UP message ==
== Initial HEADS-UP message ==


This template is aimed at notifying the grid participants soon after the incident has been discovered (heads-up), as described in Step 2 of the incident response procedure.
The initial HEADS-UP, which you should aim to send as soon as the incident has been discovered, should contain the minimum information that would allow the EGI CSIRT to notify all members of the EGI Infrastructure and close collaborations about the incident, in order to contain it. This email will, in most cases, be forwarded as-is (plus EGI case number) to all security contacts.
 
<pre><nowiki>
<pre><nowiki>
FROM: <you>
FROM: <you>
TO: abuse@egi.eu
TO: abuse@egi.eu
SUBJECT: Security incident suspected at <site> [EGI-<Date in Format: YYYYMMDD>] TLP: AMBER
SUBJECT: [TLP:AMBER] Security incident suspected at <site>  
** AMBER Information – Limited Distribution                        **
** AMBER Information – Limited Distribution                        **
** This may be shared with trusted security teams on a need-to-know basis **
** This may be shared with trusted security teams on a need-to-know basis **
** see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions **
** see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions **
Dear security contacts,
Dear EGI CSIRT,
 
A suspected security incident has been detected at <SiteName>.
A suspected security incident has been detected at <SiteName>.
Summary of the information available so far:
Summary of the information available so far:
<Ex: A malicious SSH connection was detected from 012.012.012.012. The extent of the incident is
<Ex: A malicious SSH connection was detected from 012.012.012.012. The extent of the incident is
Line 35: Line 38:
== Follow-up message ==
== Follow-up message ==


This template can be used to provide a detailed view of the incident, and may be completed and reposted as the investigation progresses.
 
This template can be used to provide a detailed view of the incident, and may be completed and resent as the investigation progresses.
The data in this email will, in most cases, be forwarded to all security contacts, but some filtering might be applied if deemed necessary


<pre><nowiki>
<pre><nowiki>
FROM: <you>
FROM: <you>
TO: <site-security-contacts@mailman.egi.eu/abuse@egi.eu>
TO: abuse@egi.eu
SUBJECT: Security incident suspected at <site> [EGI-<Date in Format:YYYYMMDD>] TLP:AMBER
SUBJECT: [TLP:AMBER] Security incident suspected at <site>
** AMBER Information – Limited Distribution                        **
** AMBER Information – Limited Distribution                        **
** This may be shared with trusted security teams on a need-to-know basis **
** This may be shared with trusted security teams on a need-to-know basis **
** see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions **
** see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions **


Dear security contacts,
Dear EGI CSIRT,


A security incident has been detected at <SiteName>.
A security incident has been detected at <SiteName>.

Revision as of 16:37, 14 June 2017

EGI-CSIRT web site EGI-CSIRT Public wiki EGI-CSIRT Contacts EGI-CSIRT Activities EGI-CSIRT Private wiki


How to report a security incident

Please follow the EGI Security Incident Handling Procedure to report a security incident to abuse at egi.eu (PGP key). Below you will find some explanations about that incident response procedure.

Sites must report an incident or possible incident to abuse at egi.eu (at least within 4 hours after the suspected incident has been discovered).

You will find it useful to print the File:SEC01-RC.pdf


There is also a Forensic Howto page.

Initial HEADS-UP message

The initial HEADS-UP, which you should aim to send as soon as the incident has been discovered, should contain the minimum information that would allow the EGI CSIRT to notify all members of the EGI Infrastructure and close collaborations about the incident, in order to contain it. This email will, in most cases, be forwarded as-is (plus EGI case number) to all security contacts.

FROM: <you>
TO: abuse@egi.eu
SUBJECT: [TLP:AMBER] Security incident suspected at <site> 
** AMBER Information – Limited Distribution                        **
** This may be shared with trusted security teams on a need-to-know basis **
** see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions **
Dear EGI CSIRT,

A suspected security incident has been detected at <SiteName>.

Summary of the information available so far:
<Ex: A malicious SSH connection was detected from 012.012.012.012. The extent of the incident is
unclear for now, and more information will be published in the coming hours as forensics are
progressing at our site. However, all sites should check for successful SSH connection from
012.012.012.012 as a precautionary measure.>

Follow-up message

This template can be used to provide a detailed view of the incident, and may be completed and resent as the investigation progresses. The data in this email will, in most cases, be forwarded to all security contacts, but some filtering might be applied if deemed necessary

FROM: <you>
TO: abuse@egi.eu
SUBJECT: [TLP:AMBER] Security incident suspected at <site>
** AMBER Information – Limited Distribution                        **
** This may be shared with trusted security teams on a need-to-know basis **
** see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions **

Dear EGI CSIRT,

A security incident has been detected at <SiteName>.

- Short summary of the incident
<Provide a high-level overview of the incident>

- Host(s) affected
<List of compromised hosts and/or hosts running suspicious user code.
ex: grid-worker-node-124.mysite.org (123.123.123.123)>

- Host(s) used as a local entry point to the site (ex: UI or WMS IP address)
<The host that the attacker is likely to have used to access the site.
ex: grid-ui-101.mysite.org (123.123.123.124)>

- Remote IP address(es) of the attacker
<The remote host from where the attacker is likely to have connected from.
ex: 123.adsl.somecorp.com (012.012.012.012)>

- Evidence of the compromise, including timestamps (ex: suspicious files 
or log entry) <Ex: the attacker logged in has root from 123.adsl.somecorp.com. 
Times are UTC:
Mar 24 12:00:09 grid-ui-101 sshd[13896]: Accepted password for root 
from 012.012.012.012>

- What was lost, details of the attack
<Provide available details on the extent of the compromise. Ex:
System logs revealed the attacker guessed the root password of 
grid-ui-101 on Mar 24 12:00:09
(UTC) after hundreds of attempts. Then, the attacker [...] etc.>

- If available and relevant, the list of other sites possibly affected
<Ex: firewall logs reveal suspicious SSH connections from the compromised node to grid-
ui.friendlysite.org on Mar 24 13:01:03 (UTC). friendlysite.org has been contacted.>

- Possible vulnerabilities exploited by the attacker
<Ex: the attacker exploited a weak root password and gained further access by exploiting CVE-2009-
1234 against [...] etc.>

- Actions taken to resolve the incident
<Ex: Disk images have been saved, hosts have been reinstalled from scratch with new, strong root
passwords, and SSH has been configured to prevent "root" logins with password.>

- Recommendations for other sites, actions suggested
<Ex: Sites should check and report any successful SSH connection from grid-ui-101 between Mar 24
12:00:09 (UTC) and Mar 24 17:00:00 (UTC).
It is also recommended to avoid direct SSH access, and to configure sshd with "PermitRootLogin
without-password".>

- Timeline of the incident
<Ex:
2009-03-24 09:12:43 UTC Multiple SSH connection attempts from 12.012.012.012
2009-03-24 12:00:09 UTC Attacker connects as root on grid-ui-101.mysite.org from 012.012.012.012
2009-03-24 13:01:03 UTC SSH scan from grid-ui-101 against grid-ui.friendlysite.org
[...]
2009-03-24 15:00:00 UTC Site security team investigating
2009-03-24 15:34:00 UTC EGI security contacts informed [...]>

About the EGI security incident handling procedure

EGI-CSIRT developed the EGI Security Incident Handling Procedure. The document have been approved by EGI OMB and PMB. EGI sites must follow this procedure when handling security incident.

The "Security Incident Handling Procedure" define site and incident coordinator responsibilities when handling Grid-related security incident. We strongly encourage our security contacts and system administrators to have a printing copy of this procedure.