Difference between revisions of "EGI CSIRT:Alerts/liblinker-2010-10-18"

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(Created page with 'Introduction ============ Earlier today, Tavis Ormandy released information about a vulnerability in GNU libc, complete with an exploit that on many systems can give any local u…')
 
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Introduction
+
Introduction
============
+
============
 
+
Earlier today, Tavis Ormandy released information about a
+
Earlier today, Tavis Ormandy released information about a
vulnerability in GNU libc, complete with an exploit that on many
+
vulnerability in GNU libc, complete with an exploit that on many
systems can give any local user root privileges. (For full details,
+
systems can give any local user root privileges. (For full details,
see the link below.)
+
see the link below.)
 
+
This vulnerability has been labelled CVE-2010-3847, and is present on
+
This vulnerability has been labelled CVE-2010-3847, and is present on
many Linux distributions, including RHEL/CentOS/SL 5 (but *not* RHEL 3
+
many Linux distributions, including RHEL/CentOS/SL 5 (but *not* RHEL 3
and 4 and their derivatives). Vendor patches are not yet available.
+
and 4 and their derivatives). Vendor patches are not yet available.
 
+
Details
+
Details
=======
+
=======
 
+
As far as is known, the vulnerability can only be exploited if users can
+
As far as is known, the vulnerability can only be exploited if users can
write to a file system that contains binaries with suid root
+
write to a file system that contains binaries with suid root
permissions. (Since it is necessary for the attacker to create a hard
+
permissions. (Since it is necessary for the attacker to create a hard
link to a suid root binary.)
+
link to a suid root binary.)
 
+
This is, for instance, the case if /bin is located on the same
+
This is, for instance, the case if /bin is located on the same
filesystem as /tmp (or any other user writable location, like /var/tmp,
+
filesystem as /tmp (or any other user writable location, like /var/tmp,
/home, /var/lib/texmf, and so on). This is unfortunately a common
+
/home, /var/lib/texmf, and so on). This is unfortunately a common
configuration.
+
configuration.
 
+
Mitigation
+
Mitigation
==========
+
==========
 
+
To make it impossible to make the required hard link, directories
+
To make it impossible to make the required hard link, directories
containing suid/sgid binaries can be made to appear to as separate
+
containing suid/sgid binaries can be made to appear to as separate
file systems by doing
+
file systems by doing
 
+
  mount -o bind /sbin /sbin
+
  mount -o bind /sbin /sbin
 
+
for each such directory.  
+
for each such directory.  
 
+
Please note that these commands must be re-run whenever the system is
+
Please note that these commands must be re-run whenever the system is
rebooted, for example by adding them to a suitable init script.
+
rebooted, for example by adding them to a suitable init script.
 
+
A baseline list of directories with suid/sgid binaries on a typical
+
A baseline list of directories with suid/sgid binaries on a typical
RHEL 5 system is:
+
RHEL 5 system is:
 
+
  /bin
+
  /bin
  /sbin
+
  /sbin
  /usr/bin
+
  /usr/bin
  /usr/libexec
+
  /usr/libexec
  /usr/lpp
+
  /usr/lpp
  /usr/sbin
+
  /usr/sbin
 
+
You should check for any additional site specific locations using a command
+
You should check for any additional site specific locations using a command
like
+
like
 
+
  find / -type f \( -perm /u+s -o -perm /g+s \)
+
  find / -type f \( -perm /u+s -o -perm /g+s \)
 
+
that will list all files with suid/sgid permissions.
+
that will list all files with suid/sgid permissions.
 
+
 
 
+
Recommendations
+
Recommendations
===============
+
===============
 
+
Apply the mitigation method above for all relevant locations.
+
Apply the mitigation method above for all relevant locations.
 
+
You may wish to suspend user logins and job submission until these steps
+
You may wish to suspend user logins and job submission until these steps
have been taken; please refer to your local site policy.
+
have been taken; please refer to your local site policy.  
 
+
Apply vendor updates as soon as they become available.
+
Apply vendor updates as soon as they become available.
 
+
References
+
References
==========
+
==========
 
+
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Oct/257
+
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Oct/257

Revision as of 17:17, 18 October 2010

Introduction
============

Earlier today, Tavis Ormandy released information about a
vulnerability in GNU libc, complete with an exploit that on many
systems can give any local user root privileges. (For full details,
see the link below.)

This vulnerability has been labelled CVE-2010-3847, and is present on
many Linux distributions, including RHEL/CentOS/SL 5 (but *not* RHEL 3
and 4 and their derivatives). Vendor patches are not yet available.

Details
=======

As far as is known, the vulnerability can only be exploited if users can
write to a file system that contains binaries with suid root
permissions. (Since it is necessary for the attacker to create a hard
link to a suid root binary.)

This is, for instance, the case if /bin is located on the same
filesystem as /tmp (or any other user writable location, like /var/tmp,
/home, /var/lib/texmf, and so on). This is unfortunately a common
configuration.

Mitigation
==========

To make it impossible to make the required hard link, directories
containing suid/sgid binaries can be made to appear to as separate
file systems by doing

  mount -o bind /sbin /sbin

for each such directory. 

Please note that these commands must be re-run whenever the system is
rebooted, for example by adding them to a suitable init script.

A baseline list of directories with suid/sgid binaries on a typical
RHEL 5 system is:

  /bin
  /sbin
  /usr/bin
  /usr/libexec
  /usr/lpp
  /usr/sbin

You should check for any additional site specific locations using a command
like

  find / -type f \( -perm /u+s -o -perm /g+s \)

that will list all files with suid/sgid permissions.
 

Recommendations
===============

Apply the mitigation method above for all relevant locations.

You may wish to suspend user logins and job submission until these steps
have been taken; please refer to your local site policy. 

Apply vendor updates as soon as they become available.

References
==========

http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Oct/257