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** WHITE information - Unlimited distribution allowed ** ** see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:TLP for distribution restrictions ** EGI CSIRT ADVISORY [EGI-ADV-20110615-02] Title: High Risk - Torque Authentication Bypass Vulnerability - Update [EGI-ADV-20110615-02] CVE-2011-2907 Date: 2011-06-14 Updated: 2011-06-20 Updated: 2011-08-15 URL: https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:Alerts/Torque-2011-06-15 URL: https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/SVG:Advisory-SVG-2011-2296 Introduction ============ This is an update to the advisory [EGI-ADV-20110615], as a patch is available in EPEL, and additionally this vulnerability has been made public. This vulnerability has also been assigned CVE-2011-2907 Details ======= The advisory sent by CSIRT[EGI-ADV-20110615] intentionally did not contain full details on the vulnerability, since it was not then public. The impact of the vulnerability can be summarized like this: If you are running a vulnerable Torque version and have not applied the recommended "acl_hosts" configuration, an attacker that can connect to port 15001 on the Torque server from a machine under his control can submit jobs as any user, bypassing all authentication checks in Torque. This attack machine may be located anywhere on the Internet, as long as it can connect to port 15001 on the server. Irrespective of this particular vulnerability, the EGI CSIRT strongly recommends that you always limit network connectivity to port 15001 to trusted hosts that need to contact it. This includes submit hosts (CEs), worker nodes and any other machines in the cluster that need to talk to the Torque server. Full details of the vulnerability are now available on the RedHat Bugzilla [R 1] This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2011-2907 Affected Software ================= At least Torque versions 2.3.13, 2.4.12 and 3.0.1 are vulnerable, which are commonly used in the EGI infrastructure. Other versions might also be vulnerable. Mitigation ========== Sites should carry out the following mitigating action. As always, please follow your change management procedure when making configuration change in your production environment. Step 1: put Torque server behind a firewall (but remember that your submit hosts and worker nodes need to be able to connect to it) Step 2: for each queue, make the following configuration change #Enable queue level host-based ACL set queue <queuename> acl_host_enable = True #Add a list of trusted hosts (such as your CEs) which can submit jobs to this queue set queue <queuename> acl_hosts = Trusted_CE1, trusted_CE2 Step 3: test configuration change thoroughly before rolling it into your production system. Component Installation information ================================== A patch is now available from RedHat EPEL They are detailed fully in the release notes: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/torque-2.5.7-1.el4.1 https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/torque-2.5.7-1.el5.1 https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/torque-2.5.7-1.el6 Recommendations =============== Sites are strongly recommended to run Torque behind a firewall, in particular port 15001 should be restricted so that direct access to Torque from an untrusted host is not allowed. Sites should check the configuration and follow the mitigating action to prevent the expolitation of this vulnerability in the Torque software. Sites should upgrade as soon as is practical, and leave firewalling in place. Credit ====== This vulnerability was reported by Bartlomiej Balcerek of the Wroclaw Centre for Networking and Supercomputing Security Team. References ========== [R 1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=713090 Timeline ======== Yyyy-mm-dd 2011-06-09 Vulnerability reported by Bartlomiej Balcerek, in addition to reporting to software providers. 2011-06-09 Acknowledgement from the EGI SVG to the reporter 2011-06-13 CSIRT members of SVG carried out further investigations and decided to recommend mitigating action. 2011-06-14 Advisory drafted with recommended mitigation. 2011-06-15 Advisory revised after further tests 2011-06-16 Advisory sent to EGI sites and NGI security contacts 2011-06-20 Update advisory sent to EGI sites and NGI security contacts 2011-08-11 Patch available in EPEL, information made public and CVE assigned 2011-08-15 Advisory revised 2011-08-16 Updated advisory sent to EGI sites and NGI security contacts